summary by N. Antić
In a repeated game players can develop a reputation for playing in a speci…c way. Building a reputation can take time, so patient players are more likely to invest.
Example
The main point of this paper can be illustrated in a repeated "Chain Store Paradox" example Monopolist facing an in…nite sequence of potential entrants, can respond aggressively or passively Period t entrant observes the entire preceding history Assume the monopolist can be a commitment type with a preference for …ghting All entrants have a common prior about this, " > 0 Theorem. In any sequential equilibrium, if is close to 1, then player 1's expected average payo¤ in equilibrium is close to 2.
Proof Sketch. Fix a sequential equilibrium and let t be the …rst period that player 1 plays "Acquiesce". If t = 1, player 2 is playing "Stay Out" and player 1 gets payo¤ 2. If t < 1, then deviating to playing "Fight" in all periods will give payo¤ at least 1 in period t and say s periods after it (until player 1's posterior is su¢ ciently high) and payo¤ 2 in subsequent periods.
Result extends to …nite number of commitment types
The Basic Environment 2 Players in each period, player 1 (the long-run player) and Player 2 (one of a sequence of short-run players)
Denote short-run player in period t by player 2 t Stage game pure action sets, A 1 and A 2 , are …nite (not critical) Denote mixed actions by i 2 (A i )
Imperfect public monitoring
Players observe a random outcome y 2 Y , where jY j = M < 1 Given action pro…le a 2 A, the probability of signal y is (yja)
Includes perfect monitoring as a special case S 1 denotes the set of all pure strategies for player 1
Mixed strategies for players 1 and 2 t are 1 2 (S 1 ) and
Mixed strategy pro…le = ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 (S) induces a probability distribution over fa 1 (t) ; a 2 (t)g Let E denote the expectation w.r.t. this distribution
The average expected utility of player 1 is:
# Another way to think about mixed strategies, useful when type spaces are in…nite
Developed by Milgrom and Weber (1985) Requires to be a Polish space A distributional strategy for player 1, s 1 , is a probability measure on Borel sets of S 1
Consistency requirement-the marginal distribution on is
Let S 1 denote all the distributional strategies of player 1
Note that for any
where 
Denote by B " ( 1 ) the set of "-con…rmed best responses to 1 B 0 ( 1 ) is not the set of all undominated best responses These are generalized best responses (Fudenberg and Levine, 1989) A Nash equilibrium is (s 1 ; 2 ) 2S 1 (S 2 ) so that t 2 is a best response to s 1 ( ) and (!; s 1 ) 2 supp(s 1 ) implies s 1 is a best response to 2 by type !
Nash equilibrium exists
Existence in …nite truncations of the game proven by Milgrom and Weber (1985) Fudenberg and Levine (1983) show that for …nite-action imperfect information games which are uniformly continuous mixed-strategy sequential equilibria exist Action spaces and signal spaces are …nite, U 1 and v 2 are uniformly continuous
Let N 1 ( ; !) and N 1 ( ; !) be the inf and sup of type !'s payo¤ in any Nash equilibrium of the repeated game with discount rate
Let "-least commitment payo¤ for type ! be:
Let "-greatest commitment payo¤ for type ! be:
Main Theorem
Theorem (3.1). For all " > 0 there exists a K so that for all
Upper bound seems weak, but is not Benabou and Laroque (1988) show that a long-run player can attain utility higher than his Stackelberg payo¤ for low Later we will prove that this is impossible as ! 1
Before proving this theorem, we state an ancillary theorem, which will be required to prove theorem 3.1
Theorem (4.1). For every " > 0, 0 > 0 and + with ( + ) > 0 there is a K ("; 0 ; ( + )) such that for any s 1 and 2 , under the probability distribution generated by s 1 ( + ), there is a probability less than " that there are more than K ("; 0 ; ( + )) periods with:
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Fix a Nash equilibrium (s 1 ; 2 ); (s 1 ; 2 ) and induce a joint probability distribution over types and histories. Short-run players must use Bayesian updating in a Nash equilibrium to form posterior beliefs. Let 2 (h t 1 ) denote the mixed action generated by 2 which player 2 t plays following history h t 1 ; similarly for 1 (h t 1 ) and + 1 (h t 1 ). Let player 2 t 's prediction of the outcome conditional on h t 1 and equilibrium strategies be p (h t 1 ) 2 (Y ). Let p + (h t 1 ) also condition on the true type being in + . Short-run types almost have the correct distribution of outcomes even if they do not know that the long-run player's type is in + . A period is "exceptional" if short run players get a surprise in the above respect. Take + = f! 0 g and 0 = " and apply theorem 4.1. There exists a K so that in all but K periods with probability (1 ") we have:
Thus with probability (1 ") player 2 t 's equilibrium action 2 (h t 1 ) 2 B " + 1 (h t 1 ) . If player 2 t expects an outcome "-close to p + (h t 1 ), then player 2 t must be playing a "-con…rmed best response to the mixed strategy that ! 0 would play after history h t 1 .
Further, since commitment types have full support, player 2 t will not play a strategy that is weakly dominated, i.e., 2 (h t 1 ) 2 B 0 ( 1 (h t 1 ) ).
The payo¤ to rational player 1 is:
Rational player's payo¤ in exceptional periods is bounded above by u. There are at most K exceptional periods (which occur with probability greater than ") and U 1 ( + ; ! 0 ) is maximized if these occur at the start.
Type ! 0 must want to play its equilibrium strategy and its equilibrium payo¤ in non-exceptional periods is at most v 1 (! 0 ; ") . This proves the upper bound part of the theorem.
To prove the lower bound, use theorem 4.1 again, but take + to be a neighborhood of the "best" commitment type for the rational long-run player.
Fix any 1 2 (A 1 ) and take + to be the types which play mixed strategies 0 1 in the neighborhood of 1 . Let e " > 0 be such that if j
. Such e " exists since v 1 and are continuous and de…ned on compact sets. By de…nition
Apply theorem 4.1, with + as de…ned above and 0 = " 2 and note that ( + ) > 0. Suppose the rational player follows strategy + 1 corresponding to some commitment type in + . In non-exceptional periods, with probability at least (1 "), player 2 plays an " 2 -con…rmed best responds to this strategy, but since kv 1 ( 1 ; 2 ; ! 0 ) v 1 ( 0 1 ; 2 ; ! 0 )k 1 < ", we have that in nonexceptional periods ! 0 obtains payo¤ at least:
In exceptional periods the payo¤ is uniformly bounded from below by u.
Corollary (3.2). Taking the limit as " ! 0 we have that:
Proof. From Theorem (3.1) need to show that:
Take f" n g 1 n=1 ! 0 and n 2 2 B " n ( 1 ) for all n and note that lim n n 2 2 B 0 ( 1 ).
A game is non-degenerate if @a 2 2 A 2 which is undominated such that for some 2 6 = a 2 , v ( ; 2 ) = v ( ; a 2 ).
Satis…ed for an open, dense set of payo¤s A game is identi…ed if for each 2 that is not weakly dominated
Generically, average payo¤ of a patient long-run player in any NE is determined by reputation e¤ects if actions are observed
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Since the game is identi…ed B 0 ( 1 ) the set of 0-con…rmed best responses is simply the set of undominated best responses to 1 . Su¢ ces to show that for 2 2 B 0 ( 1 ), there exists a sequence f n 1 g 1 n=1 which converges to 1 such that:
There exists some mixed action 0 1 2 (A 1 ) such that 2 is a strict best response to 0 1 . Take a sequence f n g 1 n=1 such that n 2 (0; 1) and n ! 1. De…ne
Note that 2 is a strict best response to n 1 .
Remarks about the Technical Result
The main technical contribution of the paper is theorem 4.1, restated here for convenience Theorem (4.1). For every " > 0, 0 > 0 and + with ( + ) > 0 there is a K ("; 0 ; ( + )) such that for any s 1 and 2 , under the probability distribution generated by s 1 ( + ), there is a probability less than " that there are more than K ("; 0 ; ( + )) periods with:
To prove the above, …rst show that the odds ratio is a supermartingale (lemma 4.1)
Supermartingales converge almost surely, but not uniformly
Fudenberg and Levine show that active supermartingales converge uniformly
To show the rest of the theorem, note that in exceptional periods, there is a substantial (i.e., greater than 0 ) probability that the short run player will be substantially wrong in their forecast Thus, the supermartingale L t is active, in the sense that L t has a signi…cant probability of decreasing by a sizable fraction
Use the level of activity of a supermartingale to get a bound for the number of exceptional periods Sorin (1999) remarks that Theorem 4.1 is a "uniform version" of the merging of beliefs theorem by Blackwell and Dubins (1962) Blackwell and Dubins (1962) consider when posterior beliefs of individuals will merge, if individuals start with different priors and observe the same outcomes
Concluding Remarks
Introducing reputation yields a sharp prediction for the payo¤ of patient long-run players Generically, if the long-run player's action is statistically identi…ed, the long-run player obtains his Stackelberg payo¤
